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Abstract: Much of the literature, regardless of academic discipline, presents the publication of
Economic Development in 1958 as analogous to a “big bang” event in the creation of modern
Ireland. However, such a “big bang” perspective misrepresents the sophistication of economic
debates prior to Whitaker’s report as well as distorting the interpretation of subsequent
developments. This paper reappraises Irish economic thinking before and after the publication of
Economic Development. It is argued that an economically “liberal” approach to Keynesianism,
such as that favoured by T. K. Whitaker and George O’Brien, lost out in the 1960s to a more
interventionist approach: only later did a more liberal approach to macroeconomic policy triumph.
The rival approaches to academic economics were in turn linked to wider debates on the influence
of religious authorities on Irish higher education. Academic economists were particularly
concerned with preserving their intellectual independence and how a shift to planning would keep
decisions on resource allocation out of the reach of conservative political and religious leaders.
I INTRODUCTION
I
nstitutional economists and economic historians have written much on the
supposed economic advantages that arise from having superior institutional
structures (North, 1990). The experience of having a British rather than an
Iberian colonial legacy is supposed to be one such advantage that gives a
newly independent state a “pole position” in the “starting grid” of the economic
development “grand prix” (North, 1990).1 Ireland, north and south of course,
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1 Another economic advantage Ireland had relative to other colonies was its starting point in
terms of the level of economic development it had achieved prior to independence. In 1913 Ireland
had a GDP per head of $655. This figure is much higher than then figure attained by most Third
World countries on the eve of their own independence. A similar picture emerges if one considers
other variables such as infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy and women’s status.
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Economic historians of Ireland and institutional economists should, therefore,
be interested in the observation that there were between six and seven
decades between the attainment of political independence and the start of the
Tiger economy.2 Hence Ireland’s economic success was delayed and it was not
simply the inevitable result of the institutional architecture that it inherited
from the days of British rule (Brownlow, 2009).3 Garvin’s  Preventing the
Future explains Irish underperformance observed during the Golden Age of
economic growth as being due to the ability of conservative political and
religious vested interests to successfully oppose economic modernisation.4
This negative coalition was according to Garvin able to stifle development for
at least a generation (Garvin, 2004; Honohan, 2004; Murphy, 2005).
Garvin’s thesis thus explains Ireland’s poor showing in the “grand prix” of
post-independence economic development in terms of failures within the Irish
elite’s control as well as events outside of its control. According to Garvin’s
analysis the education system was an important component in the failure of
political and religious leadership to prioritise economic transformation over
the maintenance of social stability. In this paper, rather than considering the
economics of Irish institutions, the focus is on some of the major institutions
of Irish economics. Garvin notes, in a speculation that links to an argument
developed in Section IV of this paper, that:
It is perhaps significant that economics became the only developed social
science in the emergent, mainly Catholic, new universities in modern Ireland
not to have a large Catholic and clerical intellectual input (Garvin, 2004, 
p. 52).
Indeed it was significant that economics escaped the fate of these other
social sciences. Moreover, economists by the 1960s reacted to the existence of
moral conservatism by following a quantitative research agenda that
promoted modernisation and technocratic policymaking.
Economic Development is the prism through which much of contemporary
Irish economic history has been understood. It should be noted at the outset
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2 It should be noted that Johnson and Kennedy argue that Ireland’s economic performance in the
period between the 1920s and the 1990s was not out of kilter with the mainstream European
experience (Johnson and Kennedy, 2003).
3 Moreover, independent Ireland’s late start to industrialisation may have been an advantage
rather than a disadvantage because it was able to “leapfrog” a reliance on mature staple
industries that elsewhere in the developed world had contributed to economic decline (Brownlow,
2009).
4 For evidence of Irish economic underperformance during the Golden Age see (Crafts, 2008).
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merely contends in Sections II and III that its message has been distorted.
This distortion has been to the detriment of an accurate understanding of the
role of economic thinking within Ireland’s transformation since 1958. Such a
misrepresentation of the historical record needs to be recognised if Ireland’s
institutional dynamics and its economic performance since 1958 are to be
understood. The undeniable centrality of the Whitaker report to the economic
historian, especially one informed by modern institutional analysis, is that the
economic objectives Economic Development sought, ending what it called the
“economic decadence” of emigration and unemployment, meant that Ireland’s
earlier institutional settlement could not persist over the long run (Whitaker,
1958, p. 2).
By implication then, the “big bang” view (explored in Sections II and III)
is at best half right: while the Whitaker Report mattered to subsequent
developments in economy, it did not matter for reasons that most writers have
suggested it did. Economic Development mattered not because it ushered in
Keynesian demand management, indicative planning or led inevitably to the
Celtic Tiger: it mattered instead because it accelerated, through a process of
accident rather than design, many of the underlying supply-side reforms that
were needed. However, these reforms followed an interventionist interlude
that was detrimental to long-term economic performance. The application of
institutional economics is useful to understanding this process. The
mechanisms that sustained Ireland’s supply-side reforms were exactly the
kind of demographic and institutional changes that have been discussed by
later institutional economists (Brownlow, 2002).
Sections IV and V seek to locate changes in Irish economics within
changes within economics as a subject, rather than changes within Irish
politics. In Section IV an initial argument is made that interwar Irish
economic thinking was not backward as has been suggested by historians. It
will additionally be argued that post-war Ireland was affected by two global
intellectual revolutions within economics namely, it was affected by the
emergence of Keynesianism(s) as a response to a “Keynesian Revolution” and
it was also affected by the shift towards formalism. Section V in turn links the
eclipse of toolkit economics to shifts in the practice of academic economics. By
the 1990s the notion of a discernable Irish economic tradition seemed quaint
in a way that a century earlier would not have been true. Independent Ireland
was not unique in the path that its economic thought took over the course of
the twentieth century. However, what was unique was the role that reactions
to cultural and religious conservatism may have played in the direction that
economic research took within Ireland. It is at this point that Garvin’s insights
connect with the history of Irish economics.
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Writers on long-run economic development have repeatedly contrasted the
protectionist economic ideology of the 1930s with the more liberal export-
orientated strategy that became dominant from the 1960s until the present
day (Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh, 1988, pp. 55-75; Ó Gráda, 1997, pp. 46-55).
It has been widely recognised that the application of the earlier ideology had
enduring consequences for Irish economic health even if protection failed as a
policy of employment creation (Riordan, 2000; Regan and Cronin, 2000;
Johnson, 1989). The later institutional settlement is likewise often
characterised in the literature by the abandonment of the nationalistic and
protectionist economic philosophy inherited from the 1930s. Yet it should be
noted that the discussion in the literature of the exact institutional elements
of the transformation process that led from an import substitution to an
export-orientated strategy remains relatively obscure. This finding applies
even to economists writing from a nominally institutionalist perspective
(Mjøset, 1992, pp. 262-282). While there have been some recent tentative steps
in the direction of considering how institutional capacity and political economy
affected economic development on the island there remains noticeable
analytical and archival gaps where such a shift should ideally be explained.5
The existence of such gaps has led to repeated attempts at filling the void
through recourse to a simple but misleading focus on locating a single event
that can be viewed as a watershed or turning point in Irish economic
performance. The usual way that the search for a discontinuity in the period
in the years between 1945 and 1958 (some have also looked to the years 1932-
1958 for the turning point) has been solved is to identify a key event.
Economists, political scientists, literary critics to say nothing of civil servants
and politicians have contributed to the construction of a historical narrative
along these lines (Fanning, 1990, pp. 74-76). The publication of Economic
Development, also called the Whitaker report after its author, has been
identified as just such a “seismic shift” in the creation of modern Irish
economic development. The White Paper that stemmed from Economic
Development, the first Programme for Economic Expansion, also plays a
supporting role in this “big bang” literature (Bradley, 2001, p. 4).
As will be shown in this paper, terming this literature big bang, analogous
to the scientific literature on the birth of the universe, is not too much of an
exaggeration. Writers from this big bang perspective suggest that between
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5 An early attempt at such a discussion regarding the Republic of Ireland is (Barry, 2008a; 2008b
and 2008c). In the case of Northern Ireland see (Brownlow, 2007) and for the two Irelands see
(Brownlow, 2002).
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The big bang narrative contends that it was only the appearance of
revolutionary documents such as Economic Development that took Irish
economic policy out of the darkness associated with protectionism. F. S. L.
Lyons exemplifies this big bang interpretation of Ireland’s modern economic
history. In his epic, and highly influential, Ireland Since the Famine, Lyons
claimed that:
Economic Development…was at once recognised not merely as an important
contribution to the economic debate, but as offering a way out of the economic
impasse. It is hardly too much to say, indeed, that even today it can be seen as
a watershed in the modern economic history of the country (Lyons, 1973, 
p. 618).
In some of the other standard works the supposedly revolutionary role of
Economic Development is highlighted and taken for granted. By way of
illustration, Ronan Fanning in Independent Ireland presents the Whitaker
report as the central text of the Lemass (or what Fanning regards as the
Lemass-Whitaker) era. He describes Economic Development variously as “… a
landmark in modern Irish history” which ushered in the new era of free trade
(Fanning, 1983, p. 192). In a later essay on the Whitaker report, which given
the excessively reverential tones in which he writes about Economic
Development, is aptly entitled “The Genesis of Economic Development”,
Fanning suggests that it is beyond dispute that the report “redirected the
course of twentieth century Irish history” (Fanning, 1990, p. 76).6
This narrative of Economic Development as a big bang is also an
interventionist interpretation of Ireland’s economic performance since 1958.
The eventual victory of a government policy of economic planning is an
essential part of this thesis (Kennedy, 1990, p. 14). The (often self-serving)
narratives constructed in support of the big bang narrative are ones that
assume prudent government intervention overcome market failure. Bradley
for instance suggests that the contribution of Whitaker to Irish economic
history was that Economic Development created a sustained government
commitment to engage in “… state intervention to manage aggregate demand
and not leave the economy to the mercy of market forces” (Bradley, 1990, 
p. 132). By way of further illustration, in the same book of essays in which
Bradley’s assessment appears, no Irish owned private sector firm even
warrants a mention in the index (McCarthy, 1990a).
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political needs with the nation’s economic progress (Lee, 1989, p. 373; Lee, 1990, p. 124; Lee, 1996,
p. 59).
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Ireland’s economic performance solely through the lens of civil servants and
politicians leads to a seriously skewed view of institutional and economic
dynamics. Business plays, at best, a supporting role in these statist
narratives. The assumption that was termed the “… belief in the superior
wisdom of the state” by William Kingston has affected historical interpretation
as well as attitudes to contemporary policy (Barry, 2008a, p. 259). From a
modern institutional economist’s perspective, the assumption that an
imperfect private sector response to trade liberalisation was inferior to an
alternative response (real or imagined) based on intervention is guilty of
committing what has been termed the “Nirvana Fallacy” (Demsetz, 1969).
Likewise, the lazy assumption that the outcomes that followed interventions
were superior to a market-based alternative is guilty of the same fallacy.
If the proponents of the big bang or statist narrative are to be believed it
was only the intellectual brilliance of Whitaker and his team (and/or the Irish
political class) that set Ireland on a course towards economic modernity
(McCarthy, 1990b, pp. 14-21). Hence, it is correct to note the importance of
personalities is another important component in the conventional narrative
(Kennedy, 1990, p. 14). The important role attributed to Seán Lemass in the
literature is understandable. Lemass is often invoked in this influential
interpretation of modern Irish economic history in order to emphasise the
allegedly political rather than academic economic basis of the report’s
formulation (Bew and Patterson, 1982). Writers within the statist paradigm
tend to disagree only on the respective degree of credit that should be attached
to individual civil servants and politicians.7
Yet to present 1958 as a watershed, turning point or revolution that came
“out of the blue”, guided by exceptional technocrats faces at least two problems
when confronted with the evidence: first, it both underestimates the economic
debates that preceded 1958, debates that are touched on in Sections IV and V
of this paper, as well as second, it distorts our understanding of subsequent
institutional and economic developments. Furthermore, the reforms of the
1960s through to 1980s were in any case not the inevitable consequences of
Economic Development. The insights provided by “new” institutional
economics means one should be profoundly dubious of the assumptions
implicit in the conventional statist narrative. It is an interpretation that
seriously underplays the role of incentives in determining economic perform  -
ance. As has been discussed elsewhere, institutional changes are usually best
conceived as being gradual, interlocking and path dependent (Brownlow,
2002).
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the motivations behind the conventional narrative. As Bryan Fanning has
observed, it was within the pages of Administration that Whitaker’s Economic
Development came to be venerated as a classic of Irish economic writing
(Fanning, 2008, p. 194). It is perhaps in the pages of Administration that the
big bang approach with its focus on personalities, simplistic view of
Keynesianism and disregard of the Nirvana Fallacy, came to be forged.
Whitaker’s thesis that cultural change was a precondition for improved
economic performance mutated into a mantra that a cultural change had
precipitated the economic boom of the 1960s and that 1958 was the key date
in modern Irish history (Fanning, 2008, p. 197).8 This later response however
is in sharp contrast to contemporary opinion. The Irish Times decided
Economic Development contained “nothing basically new”, while both Dáil
Éireann and The Irish Independent ignored debating it respectively either in
public debate or editorial (Horgan, 1997, p. 178). As Garvin has noted, the
important impact of Economic Development to public debate was due to
precisely the fact that it was not radical. Indeed the report said what people
wanted to hear from a government. Moreover, Irish newspapers, regardless of
traditional allegiances had already by 1958 converged on a position similar to
Whitaker (Garvin, 2008, p. 18).
III  BIG BANG OR DAMP SQUIB? REINTERPRETING ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
SINCE 1958
The essentially gradual character of the reforms that occurred 1945-58,
which had implications for the development of economic policy after 1958, is
underlined when it is noted that Economic Development itself is not the
industrialisation based, free trade and Keynesian manifesto that it has been
described as being in much of the literature (Bew and Patterson, 1982;
McCarthy, 1990a; Ruane, 2008). In metaphorical terms, as Liam Kennedy has
argued, Economic Development placed its money on the agricultural donkey
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interpretation it is understandably a narrative that has not been abandoned by politicians of a
range of parties. An interpretation of Ireland’s economic transformation that places political
actors at the centre of a process that led to a “Celtic Tiger” phenomenon, and which
correspondingly tends to ignore the problem of government failure while overstating the extent of
market failures, can only be popular with (vote seeking) politicians. It is an assumption that lives
on in discussions of the origin of the Celtic Tiger (Brownlow, 2009).
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pp. 14-15). Similarly, a close reading of Economic Development suggests that
there is little evidence to suggest that substantial bets were placed on free
trade and Keynesian horses either (though as we will see later, the notion of a
single Keynesianism is arguably misleading in the Irish or indeed any other
context).
The institutional prescriptions within Economic Development were also
more nuanced than has been presented. One of Whitaker’s messages was that
different countries needed to follow different paths according to the specific
economic circumstances they faced (Whitaker, 1958, p. 6). The contents of
Economic Development indicate that Ireland’s underdeveloped economic
circumstances necessitated a market-led rather than an interventionist
planning based approach to economic management. The market-orientated
philosophy that underlined Economic Development, a philosophy with
similarities to Rostow’s “non-Communist manifesto”, was most coherently
summarised within its pages as follows:
It is not so much a question of obtaining capital as of securing the necessary
enterprise and technical competence the ‘know what’ as well as the ‘know
how’. There is no evidence that any really good project has hitherto been
stifled through lack of capital. For future development capital will be
necessary but the real shortage is of ideas. These may have to come in part
from external sources and are likely to fructify only if domestic conditions and
policy are favourable to profit-making, and direct taxation is relatively light
(Whitaker, 1958, p. 154).
Crafts recently noted that Whitaker’s discussion of institutions
anticipates the role of incentives within contemporary growth economics
(Crafts, 2008). While it is true that Economic Development is of interest to
contemporary growth theorists, the report is arguably of even more interest to
an institutional economist or a historian of economics. By way of illustration,
the report recognised that institutional changes could aid development; it also
recognised that economic shifts were going to force legislative changes. A clear
example of this recognition is presented in the statement that: “If foreign
industrial investment in Ireland does not rapidly increase, a more radical
removal of statutory restrictions should take place” (Whitaker, 1958, p. 160).
Likewise, the report’s recognition that through relying on external
investment the scope of political interference was reduced in plant location
and organisational decisions is an important one that has been largely
neglected. It was an important observation not even mentioned in the First
Programme (Whitaker, 1958, p. 43). Yet there was also a heavily political tinge
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overall level of the report’s radicalism. For instance, the report argued there
were “compelling reasons” for having seven industrial promotion bodies rather
than one. However, the report outlines no such reasons leaving the reader to
guess what these compelling reasons were (Whitaker, 1958, p. 157).
A sub-literature, epitomised by a festchrift for Whitaker, has emerged
claiming that Economic Development represented the full flowering of
Keynesianism in Ireland (McCarthy, 1990a). For instance, John Bradley after
surveying this literature suggests that the Whitaker report undoubtedly
represented the “… arrival of Keynesian macroeconomic thinking and policies
in Ireland” (Bradley, 1990, p. 131). Bradley’s further claim that inferring pre-
Keynesian influences in Economic Development is “wide of the mark”, itself
seems a dubious claim given the actual contents of the report (Bradley, 1990,
p. 132). In truth, the Whitaker report reflected pre-Keynesian views in its
discussion of “crowding out”. This pre-Keynesian tenor reflected Whitaker’s
own rejection of much of what would now be regarded as part and parcel of
Keynesianism, and corresponding advocacy of what would now be termed
“capital fundamentalism”.
Whitaker, for instance, in his 1956 paper in the Journal of the Statistical
and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland (JSSISI) was dismissive of the notion of
a multiplier. Whitaker’s critique of the multiplier has a number of components
to it. However, his most radical dissention from this aspect of what was fast
becoming the textbook Keynesian framework was his contention that under
Irish economic circumstances any pump-priming based on the multiplier
framework could promote contraction rather than expansion:
Much of the new incomes [generated by an expansion] would be spent on
imports-initially perhaps the greater part – and the process of generating
incomes might cause such a serious upset in the balance of external
payments – with loss of external resources or reduction in the exchange 
value of the currency – as to impair public confidence and negative (sic) the
initial boost given by the increase in home investment (Whitaker, 1955-56, p.
197).
Whitaker was more in tune with the tenor of the times with the emphasis
that he placed on the role of physical capital accumulation in economic
development (Whitaker, 1955-56). This emphasis he shared with the capital-
laden rhetoric of the then fashionable Harrod-Domar growth model as well as
the Rostowian take-off paradigm (Whitaker, 1955-56).
Even less was Economic Development a document based on promoting 
the virtues of a dirigiste and redistributive form of economic planning. 
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sentence of the introduction makes this clear: “It is well to reiterate here that
the aim is not to draw up a detailed five or ten-year plan of national
development. For a small country so exposed to the perpetual flux of world
economic forces there would be little sense in trying to establish a rigid
pattern of development” (Whitaker, 1958, p. 1, p. 7).10 The analysis presented
in  Economic Development suggested that a fundamental trade-off existed
between raising social welfare and stimulating output growth:
If resources are being used to the maximum to provide productive employment
and raise all-round living standards it is impossible to devote them at the
same time to improvement in social welfare – the national candle cannot be
burned at both ends (Whitaker, 1958, p. 24).
Whitaker was clearly prior to the publication of the First Programme
highly sceptical of both the aim of full employment and the use of planning as
a means of attaining unemployment reduction. Whitaker, along the lines
similar to George O’Brien, considered that the high degree of openness of the
Irish economy to international trade was a vital consideration in the
formulation of macroeconomic policy. Whitaker was particularly concerned
that the extent of openness undermined the applicability of the multiplier
concept (Whitaker, 1955-56, p. 197). Whitaker and O’Brien’s sceptical attitude
towards interventionism fell out of favour in the 1960s. Yet the failure of the
Second and Third Programmes (and the related macroeconomic problems of
the 1980s associated with debt and stagnation) necessitated a shift away from
these interventionist and planning-based interpretations of Keynesianism.
Irish economic policy by 1992 was closer to that advocated by O’Brien and
Whitaker than the policy model advocated by Lynch and FitzGerald in the
1960s.
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9 Professor Mahalanobis was a distinguished statistician and was instrumental in the creation of
a model, which owed much to Soviet models of central economic planning, that provided
intellectual justification for India’s economic plans after the 1950s (Lal, 2008).
10 Indeed, returning to the “Nirvana Fallacy” point, the Whitaker report itself is more market-
orientated than it is usually presented. Economic Development held up the social market policies
of West Germany as the model of developing an economy (Whitaker, 1958, p. 3). For this reason
alone, Ruane’s argument that the report is authored by writers “not quite believing in markets”
seems wide of the mark (Ruane, 2008, p. 17). Ruane also ignores the fact that Economic
Development is far more market-orientated than the analysis underpinning the Second or Third
Programmes. In terms of economic tools the improvement of the supply-side, through the tackling
of restrictive practices and the sources of poor productivity, rather than a vulgar “Keynesian”
pump priming exercise is the employment creation strategy advocated in Economic Development
(Whitaker, 1958, p. 26). Likewise, the First Programme also rejects state planning (Department
of Finance, 1958, p. 7, p. 34).
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period, also viewed the supply-side as the key to improved trade performance.
It suggested that increased production was the only way to reconcile the
competing demands of internal and external balance (Whitaker, 1958, p. 16).
In contrast, it described jobs created via expansionary demand-side policies as
being “artificial”. The tax cutting and capital switching recommendations
within Economic Development were eclipsed by the subsequent shift towards
welfare and higher spending (Barry, 2008b, p. 27).11 While the report called for
low taxation it made clear that low taxes were needed to attract “wealthy
foreigners” and FDI in that could generate “productive enterprise”, rather
than boosting disposable incomes (Whitaker, 1958, pp. 23-25). It is notable
that the only mention of demand-side deflation in Economic Development is as
a negative implication of emigration. Yet even the economic discussion of
emigration is also supplemented by a profound concern with the supply-side
consequences of a reduced labour supply (Whitaker, 1958, p. 5). The emphasis
of this discussion on the supply-side is repeated in the text of the First
Programme (Department of Finance, 1958, p. 35).
Neither was Economic Development the doctrinaire free trade manifesto
that Fanning argues it was (Fanning, 1983, pp. 194-196). The advantages of
protectionism in the Irish case were not challenged in either it or the First
Programme. Indeed the First Programme actually talks of the “substantial
advantages” of developing industry “under Irish industry and control”
(Department of Finance, 1958, p. 36). The philosophy of the 1932 institutional
settlement was actually identified as diversifying and developing the domestic
economic base to an extent that would not have been possible without
rejecting free trade (Whitaker, 1958, p. 13). Despite that endorsement,
Economic Development recognised that the days of Irish protectionism were
numbered. Political realities, however constrained, as late as 1958 show how
critical authors could be of the protectionist lynchpin of economic strategy. The
Irish situation was put in the following stark terms:
… sooner or later, protection will have to go and the challenge of free trade be
accepted. There is really no other choice for a country wishing to keep pace
materially with the rest of Europe (Whitaker, 1958, p. 2).
Economic Development was nevertheless enthusiastic in its support for
export-orientation. Yet the arguments used to support a policy of export-led
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stark contrast to the message of the Third Programme:
If the objective of an expanding economy is not to be jeopardised, the right cause is to replace
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employment (Whitaker, 1958, pp. 3-4).
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faced. The report, in the case of the pork and bacon industry, actually went so
far as to suggest that the domestic consumer should if necessary go short to
allow the export base to grow (Whitaker, 1958, p. 99).12
Had Ireland followed the path outlined in Economic Development, then the
share of exports going to Britain probably would not have continued to fall. All
of this evidence would suggest that the economic switch to a more diversified
export base preceded the process of institutional convergence with Europe,
rather than the other way around. This is a possibility consistent with North’s
later views on the links between institutional change and economic
development (North, 1990). What is not beyond doubt is that the key policy
instrument which underpinned the transition towards rapid economic growth,
a low corporate tax to attract inward investment, was an option that relied on
political independence (Crafts, 2008, p. 6).
IV  IRISH RESPONSE TO GLOBAL “REVOLUTIONS” WITHIN
ECONOMICS 1958–PRESENT
It has been observed that Garvin has argued that many accounts of Irish
socio-political history suffer from the unfortunate habit of viewing Irish affairs
as unique. Garvin’s work in contrast highlights the importance of the
comparative perspective (Murphy, 2005, pp. 368-369). It is from Garvin’s
comparative vantage point that the next two sections of the paper attempt to
explain trends in Irish economic management as in part representing
responses to intellectual revolutions within economics rather than being
purely the result of heroic civil servants or politicians. Honohan in his review
of Garvin for instance made much of the lack of adequate investment
appraisal and indeed any “… adequate intellectual framework for thinking
about development policy” (Honohan, 2004, p. 352).
As will be shown below, this state of affairs changed after 1958 and the
change accelerated in the 1960s. However, it will also become clear that the
Irish economic profession’s response to global changes in the practice of
economics was shaped in part by the cultural conservatism enforced within
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in 1924 to 93 per cent by 1950 (Bradley, 2001, p.7). By the time that Economic Development was
published this share was still 76.9 per cent, though this lower figure implies notable
diversification between 1950 and 1958. Moreover, by the time of the Second Programme in 1964
the share had fallen to 71.5 per cent (Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1964, p. 149). It should be
reiterated that Economic Development itself did not advocate diversifying export markets away
from Britain. In fact the Whitaker report argued for exactly the opposite aim of raising Ireland’s
exports to Britain (Whitaker, 1958).
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economic research. Ireland was however far from unique in this regard. What
was unique in the Irish case was the relationship between academia and the
church. Economists, as Garvin noted, managed to retain their intellectual
independence from the clergy. In the process economists avoided the unhappy
fate of the Irish sociological profession.
Another important observation made by Garvin, and of relevance to this
paper, is that historians and social scientists have not considered placing Irish
economics in a sufficiently comparative context. In particular, the failure to
compare the contents of Irish journals with international journals of the
period has sustained the misconception that Irish academic economists were
bypassed by changes in economic thought. Likewise, reflecting the statist
assumptions discussed earlier in the paper, it has been argued by historians
that civil servants were unusually far sighted. Ronan Fanning has been
instrumental in promoting this line of argument. He stated in 1984 that “…it
is impossible to absolve university economists [between 1922 and 1952] from
Geary’s charge of sulking in their tents clutching to the tenets of pre-
Keynesian creeds” and he has more recently described the contribution of
academic economists before 1948 as “lamentable” (Fanning, 1984, p. 154;
Fanning, 2008, p. 4).
That Irish academic economists were not listened to is indisputable, but
that of course is not evidence by itself that they were outdated in their views.
Moreover, in George Duncan’s publications of the period that Fanning
commentated on there was plenty of analysis that could not be regarded as
lamentable by any fair minded observer of contemporary economic thinking
(Murphy, 2006). More generally, Fanning’s excessively negative assessment of
trends in interwar Irish economic thinking, an assessment not based on any
academic background in economics, is inconsistent, however, with more recent
research in the history of economic thought (Laidler, 1999; Blaug, 2003).
Indeed a much more detailed analysis of Irish economic thinking during the
twentieth century does not lend support to Fanning’s assessment (Brownlow,
forthcoming).13
It has been observed that Austrian-leaning critics of the new economics
such as George Duncan were marginalised by the growing influence of
Keynesian rather than Hayekian economic rhetoric (Murphy, 2006). Critics of
Keynesianism such as Knight in the USA or Robertson and Hayek in the UK
were thus marginalised as economic debate shifted onto a new rhetorical
terrain. It is crucial to note that the Austrian leanings within George Duncan
and George O’Brien’s writings during the interwar period was a perspective
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was the publication of the General Theory, and its relative political
attractiveness, that led to the eclipse of Austrian business cycle theories.
Debates on economic policy among academics in Ireland as elsewhere were
therefore more pluralistic before 1936 than after it. Subsequent debates would
focus on deficient demand as an explanation of unemployment. However, the
role of planning in demand management and supply-side reform would divide
economists in Ireland. Disagreements on these topics were natural given the
ambiguities within the General Theory. It has been noted by David Colander
that there are around eight or nine different interpretations of Keynes’s ideas,
so what Keynesian economics really implies has been inevitably left open to
dispute (Colander, 1992). Colander for his part distinguishes between three
different approaches. He identifies an early informal Keynesianism that had
evolved by the 1960s into a semi-formal Neo-Keynesianism based on the
IS/LM model. This semi-formal approach was in turn replaced by an even
more formalised New Keynesianism, which was based on general equilibrium
thinking. Examples of the first two approaches can be found in the writings of
Irish economists produced between 1936 and the 1960s. A related way to
interpret the evolution of Keynesianism is to accept Davidson’s view that a
variety of Keynesian economics emerged to suit different positions on the
political spectrum (Davidson, 1972).
O’Brien’s line of argument, reflected his market-orientated views, and his
approach to macroeconomic topics evolved along what Davidson termed
“Keynesian” or “neo-classical Keynesian” lines. In his later writings he
supported using demand management to secure full employment, but he was
simultaneously critical of the effectiveness of more ambitious or inter  -
ventionist forms of planning (O’Brien, 1946; 1948). Yet O’Brien’s interpreta  -
tion of the General Theory was a view not held by Ireland’s emerging
generation of economists. It was claimed by these younger economists that the
Irish economy required state planning as in their view inadequate investment
(rather than deficient consumption) was the basis of its economic problems
(Lynch, 1944-45, pp. 439-440). This more interventionist interpretation in
turn reflected the social democratic political values held by these economists.
A second intellectual revolution within economics was based on formalisa  -
tion within economics. Academic economic debate in the interwar period was
conducted in an informal and pluralist way compared to the way it would be
conducted in the post 1945 period (Morgan and Rutherford, 1998). Ireland was
no exception in this regard as an examination of articles by Irish academics
written during the period confirms (Brownlow, forthcoming). American
evidence indicates that the transition from pluralist and informal economics of
the interwar era into the formal and neoclassical mainstream of the 1960s and
1970s came in two distinct stages (Morgan and Rutherford, 1998). In the first
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came to be associated with economists following an objective and scientific set
of tools (Morgan and Rutherford, 1998, p. 9). The second stage involved a
switch to greater abstraction. The “measurement without theory” debate
reflected this transformation (Morgan and Rutherford, 1998, p. 10; Mirowski,
2002).14 During the Cold War a turn towards geometry, algebra and measure  -
ment (and the image of objectivity it presented) offered a defence to academics
from political opposition to ideas that might have been regarded as radical if
presented in the form of words (Morgan and Rutherford, 1998, pp. 15-17).
As has been argued at greater length elsewhere, in Ireland during the
1960s similar outside pressures for political conformity existed that tended to
promote toolkit rather than literary forms of analysis (Brownlow, forth  -
coming). Yet even this toolkit form of economics would seem quaint by the
1990s. Ireland’s evolving economic policy response after 1958 needs to be
interpreted in the light of shifts within the practice of academic economics.
There was a close relationship between the drive to planning or programming,
which was stimulated by Ireland’s economic stagnation during the 1950s, and
the drive to measurement and formalisation.15 Planning implied forecasting
and forecasting implied the existence of a reliable econometric toolkit (Lynch,
1953, p. 246, 1963). Morgan and Rutherford’s explanations for the initial
success, and subsequent transformation, of toolkit economics in America have
a number of other parallels in the Irish case. There has been some attempt to
present the creation of state enterprises and other elements of economic
planning as evidence that secularism and pragmatism were by the 1960s the
order of the day.16 However, arguing that Ireland was pragmatic by this time
is an argument that appears to be grounded more in wishful thinking than in
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agricultural economics and econometrics (Morgan and Rutherford, 1998: p.9). In the case of
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experience of military and economic planning during the Second World War (Morgan and
Rutherford, 1998: p.13; Mirowski, 2002).
15 For more on Roy Geary see (Spencer, 1997 and Brownlow, forthcoming).
16 As the then academic economist, and future Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald expressed it:
It is clear that in the 1950s and early 1960s the Irish people were instinctively pragmatic in
their approach to problems, tending to reject ideological attitudes as divisive, and concerned to
secure a consensus on important issues of policy…This represented a very sharp change from
earlier decades, when the country was deeply divided on matters of political ideology, if not
social or economic ideology. It may well be that the depth of these earlier divisions, and their
disruptive effect on Irish society for several decades, together with the fact that in retrospect
many of the political issues that had divided people so deeply began to be seen as unreal, may
have induced a positive reaction against the divisive effects of ideological commitments of any
kind, encouraging instead a search for a consensus; in which the form of indicative economic
planning adopted in Ireland could play an important role (FitzGerald, 1968, pp.197-198).
05 Brownlow article_ESRI Vol 41-3  21/09/2010  10:39  Page 315the historical record. In the 1950s and 1960s public attitudes to partition, the
Irish language, sexual behaviour, abortion and divorce were hardly
“instinctively pragmatic” (Garvin, 2004).
Instead of a consensus there was a cultural divide running through Irish
public opinion. As Garvin demonstrated, an alienated educated minority had
even by the early 1960s little influence on the direction of policy relative to a
less educated conservative majority (Garvin, 2004, p. 256). The existence of
this divide bred resentment within the universities and by the 1960s this
resentment provided a fertile soil for a shift against conservative influences
within Irish higher education and society (Garvin, 2004, p. 259). It is true that
younger economists, especially those associated with UCD such as Alexis
FitzGerald, Garret FitzGerald and Patrick Lynch, were arguably part of this
anti-clerical tendency.
The contrast identified by Garvin between the Roman Catholic church’s
controlling influence within other branches of Irish social sciences relative to
the comparatively autonomous direction that economics took within the
universities highlights issues of relevance to the study of Irish economics as
well as the more general issues raised by Preventing the Future. The contrast
also shines a light on how textbook choice affects the communication of ideas.
Conway, and more recently Bryan Fanning, has observed that the Roman
Catholic Church was essential to the direction that sociology as a discipline
within Ireland took during the twentieth century (Conway, 2006; Fanning,
2008). In Conway’s view the church controlled the discipline not merely via
academic appointments and promotions but also through the contents of
textbooks (Conway, 2006, p. 13). As Fanning has put it censorship within Irish
sociology continued “…  long after literary censorship and other forms of
cultural isolationism became unfeasible” (Fanning, 2008, p. 133). Patrick
Lynch’s and Garret FitzGerald’s critiques of Irish sociologists opposition to
state interventionism become easier to explain when set in the context of this
wider cultural divide (Lynch, 1965; Conway, 2006, p. 18).
Contemporaries were well aware of the role of economists in the wider
cultural debate. Black, writing in a symposium on Economic Development, was
explicit in noting the tensions that existed between the need for economic
modernisation and what he termed “the ideas of the past” that would block the
social changes associated with such modernisation (Ó Nualláin, 1958-59, pp.
123-124). In the same symposium, Lynch observed that it was the young that
were most enthusiastic about what he perceived to be the Whitaker’s report
focus on planning (Ó Nualláin, 1958-59, p. 146). As we have seen earlier in the
paper, Economic Development was not a statist document, but interventionism
in the form of economic planning was an especially appealing option for Irish
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political interference. Planning deliberately placed the allocation of resources
in the hands of economists rather than political or religious leaders (Lynch,
1963; FitzGerald, 1968, p. 204).
Likewise, even the trend towards toolkit economics may have been
consolidated in part by the cultural divide. Formal tools, such as input-output
modelling or linear programming, were easy to present as facilitating a
modern quantifiable and scientific alternative to the “… very powerful dema  -
gogic pressures” associated with political ideology and economic nationalism
(Lynch, 1963, pp. 150-58; FitzGerald, 1968, p. 197, 204). It is notable that the
presentation of the programmes in terms of technical material, such as input-
output tables and linear programming, had the result of ensuring that the
public debate on the purpose and function of planning was minimal
(FitzGerald, 1968, p. 198). The focus in this paper is on the academic debate
on the links between Keynesianism and economic planning during the 1950s
and 60s. The outcome of this debate continued to have ramifications until the
eventual transformation into a much milder form of planning in the 1980s and
1990s. The First Programme was succeeded by the more detailed Second
(1964-70) and the Third (1969-72) Programmes. These two later Programmes
both failed to meet their targets.17 It was at this point that Whitaker and
O’Brien’s more economically liberal approach slowly moved into the
intellectual ascendancy.
V  THE ECLIPSE OF THE TOOLKIT APPROACH IN IRELAND
Education is a vital element within Garvin’s hypothesis. It was through an
underdeveloped education system that Garvin suggests that economic malaise
and cultural conformity were reinforced (Garvin, 2004; Honohan, 2004;
Murphy, 2005). In this section of the paper we consider how the changing
academic environment created a new “division of labour” within Irish
economics as the era of toolkit economics gave way to a new generation more
eager to promote formalism and more likely to have been trained outside of
Ireland. Whitaker and other policymakers were eager in the wake of Economic
Development for the universities to play a greater research role in policy-
making. Yet as a number of academic figures argued, the universities were too
overstretched with teaching commitments to fulfil this role adequately 
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symposium on the Whitaker report, suggested that an “Economic and Social
Research Centre” be established to fill this gap by conducting research on
important social and economic matters (Ó Nualláin, 1958-59, p. 121).
The Economic Research Institute (ERI), which was established in 1960,
was hence created to fill the research gap identified by Ó Nualláin. However,
as the name suggests, the ERI was initially only concerned with economic
issues in its research agenda. The scope was only broadened to include
sociological matters when the government took over the major financing in
1966. The ERI was at this point renamed the Economic and Social Research
Institute (ESRI) (Meenan, 1980, p. 206).19 The Ford Foundation funded and
promoted a research model that promoted “basic theories”, albeit only of
certain intellectual hues, being subjected to “the acid test of verification”
(Brady, 2006; Goodwin, 1998, p. 77).
It was along these lines that Britain’s National Institute for Economic and
Social Research (NIESR) was supported by the Ford Foundation between 1957
and 1962 (Backhouse, 2000, p. 34). The NIESR had an emphasis on applying
formal techniques to issues affecting the UK economy. The ERI faithfully
copied this research model. The ERI/ESRI was instrumental in applying the
toolkit approach through the 1960s.20 Furthermore, the Institute also
pioneered the application of mathematical methods, such as operational
research, to policymaking (Kennedy, 1993, p. 238). The ERI, therefore, 
pro  vides a crucial example of how an American donor’s preferences further
moved Irish economics in the direction of an internationalised research
programme.
Moreover, in the early 1960s there was no hope of securing senior staff at
home because of a shortage of suitable candidates (Kennedy, 1993, p. 229).
Hence the Institute from its very inception was international in staffing. In its
318 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
18 The 1960s were a turning point for higher education. University numbers grew from around
3,000 to 10,000 between 1924 and 1962 and from 18,000 to 93,000 between 1964-5 and 1993-4
(O’Brien, 1962, p. 23; Garvin, 2004, p. 202). Rising student numbers reflected, and in turn further
stimulated, a structural shift towards managerial and financial employment.
19 The ERI was formed in 1960 on the basis of a grant obtained from the Ford Foundation of
$280,000, equivalent at the time to  £IR100,000 (Whitaker, 1986, p.10). The lack of an organised
research capability explains why for their part, senior economists were so eager to secure funding
for a research centre. For more on the Ford Foundation and its implications for economic research
in America, western Europe and Ireland see (Brownlow, forthcoming).
20 The ESRI for instance provided advice on an input-output analysis of the economy in 1970 as
part of the Second Programme (FitzGerald, 1968, p. 71; Kennedy, 1993, p. 239). The contribution
of the ESRI to economic planning was important because while Roy Geary and the ESRI’s 
C. E. V. Leser had advocated a Dutch style input-output model as a basis for planning, other major
figures within Irish economics such as Whitaker and Garret FitzGerald had been more suspicious
of such formalism (Daly, 1997, pp.173-176).
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Another significant organisational aspect of the ERI/ESRI’s role in promoting
internationalisation was that it was instrumental in bringing major
international conferences to Dublin (Kennedy, 1993, p. 238). Such conferences
promoted internationalisation because they provided Irish-based economists
with examples of “best practice” from which they could learn. The best practice
followed was a combination of Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics and formal
approaches to microeconomics.
In line with the Ford Foundation’s wishes, and even after the government
took over funding, the research programme at the ERI/ESRI came to be
equated with the production of econometric forecasts based on formalised
macroeconomic models as well as quantitative microeconomic studies.
Furthermore, the Institute influenced further generations of researchers even
after the experiment in planning was abandoned. Academics often started
their career at the ESRI before moving into academia (Kennedy, 1993, p. 230).
However, by 1992 this ESRI research programme could be contrasted with the
much more abstract theoretical work being conducted in the universities.
Toolkit economics was eclipsed in Ireland, as elsewhere by the more
formalistic approaches to economic research identified by Morgan and
Rutherford. By the 1990s, if not earlier, the usefulness of the term “Irish
economics” may indeed have become questionable. Again Ireland was by no
means unique in this regard: similar patterns have been found elsewhere in
the literature on the internationalisation of economics.
VI CONCLUSIONS
This essay has sought to explore the fabrication of what constituted
Ireland’s economic literature during the twentieth century and the place of
Economic Development within this literature. The focus has, therefore, not
been on the economic or political history of Ireland, rather this essay has
attempted to link the development of Irish economics to the kind of topics
studied in Garvin (2004). What has been shown is that “myth making”, which
is an omnipresent feature of Irish historical writing, has existed in some
previous writings on the development of Irish economics. For instance, when
Irish economic thinking is compared relative to economic thinking elsewhere,
Ronan Fanning’s negative assessment of the quality of Irish economic
thinking between the 1920s and 1950s is untenable.
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connecting the analysis presented to Garvin’s Preventing the Future. In terms
of reversing the anti-market (or pro-interventionist) bias observed in much
that has been written previously about the place of Economic Development in
modern Irish history, as well as improving the sophistication of the discussion
of microeconomic topics, it might be worth trying to develop the standing of
contemporary business history in Ireland. Such a shift would provide a more
fully formed view of the processes underpinning Ireland’s economic trans  -
forma  tion. Moreover, if greater attention was placed on the archival record of
firms (rather than politicians responding to the pleas of firms) it may help
historians better assess the role of lobbying and rent-seeking in Irish society
as well as making it easier to explain the often inferior business performance
of indigenous firms, with their strong political connections, relative to inward
investors. A greater historical awareness of the development of business
organisation would improve our understanding of modern political as well as
economic history.
Another research implication of the analysis presented here is that further
research on the development of Keynesianism in Ireland is needed. As
discussed here, and at more length elsewhere (Brownlow, forthcoming),
Keynes ideas were discussed by academic economists as well as policymakers.
One interesting observation is that supporters as well as critics of
interventionist approaches to Keynesianism thought that Ireland’s economic
conditions necessitated a modification of the framework away from British
practice. Likewise, the precise intellectual influences on the development of
the Central Bank’s economic thinking and the consequences of this research 
in turn for Irish macroeconomic policy both remain under-researched.22
The extent to which Ireland’s monetary authorities merely copied British
policy practice rather than considered the implications for Ireland of the
emerging academic research within monetary economics remains an open
question suitable for future research.
Irish economic thinking is a topic which could benefit from further
revisionist research. If the myths, Whig assumptions and parochialism that
still in 2010 are allowed to dominate and hold back the discussion of the
development of Irish economics are to be replaced totally by a solid
scholarship, then the original sources, be it archival or journal based, need to
be read, critically and honestly before being compared with what was
happening elsewhere. As Garvin has shown, great insights can be drawn from
comparative approaches to Irish history. The development and eventual
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